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SUMMARY
The United States has long worked
closely with Japan to build a strong, multifac-
eted relationship based on shared democratic
values and mutual interest in Asian and global
stability and development.  Although the Bush
Administration came into office with an
avowed determination to promote closer
alliance relations, the failure of the govern-
ment headed by Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi to overcome economic stagnation
that has lasted more than a decade has started
to lower U.S. regard for a country which
otherwise remains an important military ally.
U.S.-Japan relations concern Members
and Committees with responsibilities or inter-
ests in trade and international finance and
economics, U.S. foreign policy, ballistic
missile defense (BMD), and regional security.
The latter include North Korea’s nuclear and
missile proliferation and China’s potential
emergence as the dominant regional military
power.  Congress has been particularly inter-
ested in issues concerning U.S. military bases
in Japan, which have played a key role in
supporting the military campaign in Afghani-
stan and the military buildup near Iraq.  
In October 2001 the Koizumi
government gained parliamentary passage of
legislation permitting the despatch of Japanese
ships and transport aircraft to the Indian
Ocean to provide rear-area logistical support
to U.S. forces engaged in the anti-terrorist
campaign in Afghanistan despite strong
opposition from both within and outside of the
ruling coalition.  Because of a constitutional
ban on military action that is not strictly for
self-defense, Japanese ships and aircraft have
been  restricted to non-combat support.   A
small Japanese flotilla which has remained on
station since late 2001 has supplied the major-
ity of the fuel needs of U.S. and British war-
ships. Japan also has been outspoken in favor
of the U.S. position on Iraq and has provided
or pledged non-combat military and
reconstruction support (but not cash payments
to the United States).
Japan’s position toward North Korea
generally has been hardening in recent
months, primarily due to Pyongyang’s nuclear
and ballistic missile programs and to North
Korea’s admission that it kidnapped Japanese
citizens in the 1970s and 1980s.  Recent signs
indicate that Tokyo may be backing away
from its previous opposition to taking coercive
diplomatic measures against North Korea,
including economic sanctions.
Due to its own concerns about North
Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs
and a rising China, Tokyo has started to bol-
ster its self-defense capabilities even as it
increases cooperation with the United States
under revised defense cooperation guidelines
agreed to in September 1997.  Japan is partici-
pating in joint research and development of a
U.S. missile defense capability, but has not
made an acquisition decision.
The traditionally large U.S. trade deficit
with Japan has been a perennial source of
friction.  The deficit reached a record $81.3
billion in 2000, but fell to $69 billion in 2001
and $70 billion in 2002 because of the
moribund Japanese economy and the current
U.S. economic slowdown.
In general, the Bush Administration has
paid somewhat less attention to the trade
deficit than did the Clinton Administration,
while calling on Tokyo to deal more vigor-
ously with its huge problem of bad bank loans,
which are a drag on Japan’s economy, and to




In response to strong U.S. diplomatic pressure, a Japanese consortium gave up
preferential negotiating rights to develop Iran’s Azadegan oil field, the country’s largest, by
not meeting a June 30, 2003 negotiating deadline.  The Financial Times reported on July 10,
2003, that Russian and Chinese companies have offered to develop the field in lieu of the
Japanese consortium.  The Bush Administration opposed the Japanese consortium’s bid as
a means of putting pressure on Iran to abandon a suspected nuclear weapons program.
Because Russia previously had proposed joint development of the Azadegan field with the
Japanese consortium, the article speculated that Japan’s withdrawal also threatened a
proposed Russia-Japan pipeline project that would divert Siberian oil to Japan instead of an
alternate proposal to deliver the oil to China. 
During a July 10, 2003 Upper House hearing on a pending bill that would allow the
despatch of Japanese military personnel to Iraq to participate in peacekeeping and
reconstruction activities, Prime Minister Koizumi defended his decision to support the
United States despite the fact that no weapons of mass destruction had been found thus far.
In response to opposition critics, Koizumi acknowledged that it was impossible to say that
military forces and civilians sent to Iraq would not face risk even if their activities were
carefully restricted to areas deemed safe.  A member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) urged the government to give Japanese forces heavy weapons and rules of engagement
for self-defense appropriate to the situation prevailing in Iraq.  The bill cleared the Lower
House on July 4.
On July 4, 2003, Japanese foreign minister Yoriko Kawaguchi reportedly told Burma’s
Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win in Tokyo that Japan would suspend new
economic aid until democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi was released from what the Burmese
military rulers term “protective custody,” and that it might suspend all aid if this did not
happen soon.  Prime Minister Koizumi refused to see the senior Burmese minister, and an
unnamed Japanese official reportedly said that there was “no way” the Prime Minister would
see a senior Burmese minister as long as Aung San Suu Kyi remained “in prison.” 
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Role of Congress in U.S.-Japan Relations
Congress cannot itself determine the U.S. approach toward Japan, but its powers and
actions in the areas of trade, technology, defense, and other policy form a backdrop against
which both the Administration and the Japanese government must formulate their policies.
Congress retains the ability to place additional pressures on Japan and other trade partners,
and on the Administration, through the legislative process.  Congress can also influence
U.S.-Japan political and security relations by its decisions on the size and configuration of
U.S. forces in Japan.
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As of early 2003 several high profile policy issues were of particular interest to
Congress, including dealing with the confrontation over North Korea’s nuclear and missile
programs, anti-terrorism cooperation, Japan’s support for U.S. policy concerning
Afghanistan and Iraq, and cooperation on missile defense.  Congress also has been active
recently in pushing the Administration to employ anti-dumping trade penalties against steel
imports from Japan, and in supporting efforts by survivors of Japan’s World War II slave
labor camps during to gain relief through the U.S. courts by opposing a long-standing U.S.
policy that gives primacy to the terms of the 1951 U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty.
U.S.-Japan Cooperation and Interdependence
 (This section was written by Richard Cronin and Mark Manyin)
The United States and Japan have long sought to promote economic cooperation, an
open global trading system, and regional stability and security.  In economic terms, the two
countries have become increasingly interdependent:  the United States is by far Japan’s most
important foreign market, while Japan is one of the largest U.S. markets and sources of
foreign investment in the United States (including portfolio, direct, and other investment).
The U.S.-Japan alliance and the American nuclear umbrella give Japan maneuvering room
in dealing with its militarily more powerful neighbors.  The alliance and access to bases in
Japan also facilitates the forward deployment of U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific,
thereby undergirding U.S. national security strategy.  Although the end of the Cold War and
collapse of the Soviet Union called into question some of the strategic underpinnings of the
alliance among both the American and Japanese public, both countries have continued to
view their interests as best served by maintaining and even strengthening the U.S.-Japan
alliance.
U.S.-Japan  Relations Under the George W. Bush Administration.  Japanese
leaders and press commentators generally welcomed the election of George W. Bush and
indications that the new administration would  emphasize alliance relations and also be less
inclined to pressure Japan on economic and trade issues.  Following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, Japan’s positive and timely response under Prime Minister Koizumi’s
leadership has fostered closer security cooperation and coordination.
Historically, U.S.-Japan relations have been strained periodically by differences over
trade and economic issues, and, less often, over foreign policy stances.  Strains arising from
trade issues peaked about 1995, after several years of conflict over the Clinton
Administration’s efforts — with mixed results — to negotiate trade agreements with
numerical targets.  President Bush visited Tokyo during February 16-19, 2002, as part of an
East Asian tour that also included South Korea and China.  The President held extensive
talks with Prime Minister Koizumi that focused on alliance relations, cooperation against
terrorism, and Japan’s continuing economic slump.  He also addressed a joint session of the
Japanese Diet (parliament). The President publicly praised Prime Minister Koizumi’s
economic reform program, but reportedly spoke bluntly in private about his disappointment
with progress.
Cooperation Against Terrorism: Response to the Attacks in New York and
Washington.  The Koizumi government strongly condemned the terrorist attacks of
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September 11, 2001, and initiated a series of unprecedented measures to protect American
facilities in Japan and provide non-lethal logistical support to U.S. military operations against
Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The latter mainly took the form at-sea
replenishment of fuel oil and water to U.S., British, French, and other allied warships
operating in the Indian, and logistical airlift.  A small flotilla of transport ships, oilers, and
destroyers has provided most of the fuel used by U.S. and allied naval forces in the Indian
Ocean since the first deployment in November 2001.  Japanese non-combat logistical support
to U.S. and allied warships was extended through the Iraq war and continued as of early July
2003.  
Japan’s ability to “show the flag” in its first such deployments since the end of World
War II was made possible by the adoption by the Japanese Diet (parliament) at the end of
October 2001 of three related bills anti-terrorism bills.   One law, the Anti-Terrorism Special
Measures Law, gave unprecedented post-World War II authority to the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) to provide “rear area” support to U.S. forces operating in the Indian
Ocean.  Permitted support includes intelligence sharing, medical care, and the provision of
fuel and water and nonlethal military supplies.  The restriction of the authority to nonlethal
supplies was a domestic political compromise aimed at reconciling Japan’s “no-war”
constitution with the government’s desire to meet the Bush Administration’s expectations
of material support.  Despite these limits, several of the measures have been seen by critics
as going beyond past interpretations of the constitutional ban on “collective defense”
activities.  In late 2003 a district court dismissed the first legal challenge to the
constitutionality of the Indian Ocean deployments.
Support for U.S. Policy Towards Iraq.   While strongly preferring a clear United
Nations role in resolving the U.S./British confrontation with Iraq, Japan nonetheless gave
almost unqualified support to the Bush Administration’s position. During an open debate in
the U.N. Security Council on February 18, Japan was one of only two out of 27 participating
countries, the other being Australia, to support the U.S. contention that even if the U.N.
inspections were strengthened and expanded, they were unlikely to lead to the elimination
of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction unless Iraq fundamentally changed its current passive
cooperation.  Koizumi and Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi called the leaders of several
undecided Security Council Members to try to persuade them to support the U.S. position.
The despatch of an Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean and the extension of the deployment
of Japanese ships there was widely interpreted as another indiction of Japanese support.
Japan anticipates playing a role in the reconstruction of Iraq, committing over $200 million
and sending a small team of civilian experts to assist the U.S. Department of Defense Office
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).  Currently, the government is
debating whether to ask the Japanese Diet to authorize the despatch of troops to Iraq or its
neighbors, primarily to provide logistical support.  Japan has been reluctant to support a U.S.
proposal to write off the foreign debts Iraq accumulated under the Saddam Hussein regime,
preferring instead a temporary freeze and/or the partial suspension of debts owed.  This is
expected to be a major topic of discussion at the G-8 summit meeting in Evian France, to be
held from June 1-3, 2003.
U.S.-Japan-China Relations.  Tokyo has watched with unease the course of U.S.-
China relations, but its own relations with Beijing have been anything but smooth, and at
present Japan seems to view China’s rising power with deepening concern.  Japanese
officials grow uncomfortable when U.S.-China relations are too close, and also when they
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deteriorate.  Japan’s own relations with China have been increasingly strained in recent years
as a result of conflicting claims to disputed islands and related Chinese intrusions into what
Japan considers its 200 mile economic zone and Japan’s concerns about China’s rising power
and influence. For its part, China has objected to the granting of a visa for a visit to Japan by
former Taiwanese president Lee Teng Hui, has complained about the treatment of Japan’s
past aggression in Japanese textbooks, and bitterly opposed an August 12, 2001 visit to the
Yasukuni War Shrine, in Tokyo, by Prime Minister Koizumi. The Yasukuni complex
enshrines the names of Japan’s war dead, including a handful of convicted war criminals.
China strongly objects to the development of closer U.S.-Japan security relations, which
Beijing sees as part of an informal containment strategy.  Recently, Tokyo and Beijing also
have engaged in trade confrontation. 
Converging Korean Peninsula Priorities? Japan’s role is critical in the current
crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs for a number of reasons.  Most
importantly, Japan has told North Korea it will provide a large-scale economic aid package
to compensate for the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910-1945.
Reportedly,  Japanese officials are discussing a package on the order of $5-$10 billion, an
enormous sum for the cash-starved North Korean economy.  Normalization of Japan-North
Korean relations was one of Pyongyang’s demands during the trilateral U.S.-North Korea-
China talks held in April 2003.  Currently, Japan is a significant source of North Korea’s
foreign exchange, by virtue of the Japanese market being a major destination for the North
Korean government’s suspected drug-running operations, and of remittances from Korean
permanent residents in Japan.  Additionally, the United States has long cited Pyongyang’s
harboring of Japanese Red Army terrorists — who face charges in Japan of hijacking a plane
in 1970 — as a reason for North Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. terrorism list, which by law
prohibits North Korea from receiving many forms of U.S. economic assistance and trading
rights.  
On September 17, 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il held a one-day summit in Pyongyang that momentarily restarted
normalization talks between the two countries, which have not established official relations
since North Korea was founded in 1948.  Kim pledged conditionally to unilaterally extend
his country’s moratorium on missile testing beyond 2003 and issued a vague promise to
comply with international agreements related to nuclear issues.  For his part, Koizumi
apologized for its colonization of the Korean Peninsula from 1910-1945 and offered to
provide North Korea with a large-scale economic aid package, much as it gave South Korea
economic assistance when Tokyo and Seoul normalized relations in 1965. 
The normalization talks and parallel security talks quickly stalled, however, due to two
developments since the summit:  North Korea’s October 2002 admission to U.S. officials
that it has a secret nuclear weapons program based on the process of uranium enrichment;
and outrage in Japan at Kim Jong-il’s admission to Koizumi that North Korea had kidnapped
13 Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s, eight of whom had died.  In October, the five surviving
abductees traveled to Japan for a visit, but their family members were not allowed to leave
North Korea.  The Japanese government has not allowed the five visitors to return to the
DPRK and has demanded that the family members be allowed to travel to Japan.  Prime
Minister Koizumi has said normalization talks will not continue unless Pyongyang begins
dismantling its uranium program and is more cooperative on the abduction issue.  In mid-
November, Japan voted with the United States to suspend shipments of heavy fuel oil to
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North Korea.  The oil was being provided under a 1994 U.S.-North Korean agreement in
which Pyongyang agreed to halt its nuclear weapons program.
Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang was a significant departure from Tokyo’s recent stance
toward North Korea and initially had the potential to put Japan at odds with the Bush
Administration’s hard-line policy.  For years, Japanese policymakers sought to move slowly
and deliberately on normalizing relations with North Korea, due to North Korea’s launching
of a long-range Taepodong Missile over Japan in August 1998, Pyongyang’s development
and deployment of medium-range Nodong missiles capable of reaching Japan, new
revelations about the abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents in the 1970s
and 1980s, and incursions by North Korean espionage and drug-running ships into Japanese
waters.  This cautious approach often created tension between Tokyo and the Clinton
Administration, which, along with South Korea’s Kim Dae Jung, had been attempting to
engage with  North Korea.  Japanese officials and commentators from across the political
spectrum generally welcomed the Bush Administration’s policy of using public accusations
and warnings to pressure North Korea to allow international inspections of its nuclear
facilities and agree to verifiable curbs to its missile program, including missile exports.   (For
more on U.S. policy toward North Korea, see CRS Issue Brief IB98045, Korea: U.S.-Korean
Relations, by Larry Niksch.)
Japan has supported most of the concrete steps the U.S. has taken since the revelations
about North Korea’s uranium nuclear program were made public in October 2002.  However,
most Japanese leaders have equivocated on the subject of taking more coercive measures
against North Korea such as economic sanctions, preferring a negotiated solution to the
crisis.  In April and May 2003, however, in the aftermath of the trilateral U.S.-North Korea-
China meeting in Beijing, Japanese policy seems to have hardened.  In Beijing, the Bush
Administration asserted that Japan should be included in future talks and that North Korea
should resolve the abduction issue with Japan. The Japanese government has toughened
enforcement of its controls on the export of potential dual-use items to North Korea and has
announced a new interpretation of domestic foreign exchange laws that would enable Tokyo
to more easily cut off bilateral trade and shut off the flow of remittances from ethnic Koreans
to their relatives in North Korea.  Specifically, Japan has moved away from its traditional
position that sanctions against North Korea would require United Nations Security Council
approval and is now taking the position that Japan could impose in cooperation with the
United States, even in the absence of specific U.N. approval.  Remittances to North Korea
are thought to have declined significantly since the early 1990s, they still are estimated to
total several millions of dollars a year.  Japan is North Korea’s second largest trading partner,
after China.  Two-way trade in 2001 was $470 million.
On May 22 and 23, President Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi held a
summit meeting at the President’s ranch near Crawford, Texas.  The invitation to meet the
President at Crawford was widely viewed as a gesture of appreciation for Japan’s strong
support of U.S. policy on Iraq.  At a joint press conference on May 23, President Bush and
Prime Minister Koizumi both declared that they shared a unity of view regarding the need
for North Korea to promptly, completely, and verifiably dismantle its nuclear program.
Koizumi declared that Japan would take “tougher measures” if North Korea escalated the
situation, and also that Tokyo, in any event, would “crack down more vigorously on illegal
activities” involving North Korea or ethnic Korean supporters in Japan.  Both leaders cited
the need for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue based via multilateral “dialogue and
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pressure.”  President Bush said that Japan and South Korea should be included if the talks
recently hosted by China were resumed.  The President also expressed strong backing for
Japan’s insistence on a full accounting of the fate of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North
Korea.
Economic Policy Differences.  The main focus of the Bush Administration’s
concern regarding the Japanese economy has been Tokyo’s failure thus far to deal with huge
amounts of bad loans which have gravely weakened the banking system, and Japan’s current
dependence on exports to keep the foundering economy afloat. 
At the end of the September 2002, shortly after returning from Pyongyang, Koizumi
replaced the head of the Financial Services Agency (FSA), which has responsibility for
overseeing the resolution of the bad loan problem, with the current Minister of State for
Economic and Financial Affairs, Heizo Takenaka, a former academic who has argued for
more radical approaches to dealing with the bad loan problem.  Koizumi also pledged to
“bring an end” to the banking system’s non-performing loan problem by 2005.
Japanese banks and their allies in the LDP have strongly resisted Koizumi’s plans.
Harsh public criticism by the four largest banks is said to be unprecedented, and some senior
LDP heavyweights with ties to the banking, insurance, and construction industries have
begun a move to replace Koizumi with a more “traditional” figure.  During late 2002
observers appeared confused as to whether they should regard moves by Economic and
Financial Minister Tanaka to attack the problem more forcefully as indicators of Japanese
government concern about further weakness of the financial system or a greater commitment
to reform. 
Claims of Former World War II POWs and Civilian Internees.  Congress has
also indicated intense interest in another issue in which the U.S. and Japanese governments
have been in essential agreement.  A number of surviving World War II POWs and civilian
internees who were forced to work for Japanese companies during the war have filed suits
in Japan and California seeking compensation of $20,000 for each POW or internee.  Former
POWs and civilian internees had been paid about $1.00-2.50 for each day out of internment
from seized Japanese assets by a congressionally established War Claims Commission
(WCC) in 1948.  Numerous suits have been filed in California against Japanese firms with
wartime or pre-war roots, including Mitsui & Co., Nippon Steel, and Mitsubishi Company
and their subsidiaries.  The suits allege that these companies subjected POWs and internees
to forced labor, torture, and other mistreatment.
Thus far, the Japanese courts and the U.S. Court of Claims have dismissed the suits on
grounds that Japan’s obligations to pay compensation were eliminated by Article 14 of the
1951 Multilateral Peace Treaty with Japan.  The State Department  and Department of Justice
support the position of the Japanese government, but a number of Members of Congress have
sided with the plaintiffs.  The issue received intensified attention in the 107th Congress as a
consequence of a decision in December 2000 by Kajima corporation, a giant construction
company, to pay $4.6 million into a fund for 986 mainland Chinese who had been forced to
perform labor in a notorious Kajima-run camp in northern Japan.
Two conflicting court decisions in California in early 2003 have further clouded the
prospects for the victims’ claims.  A January 2003 decision by a California appeals court
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ruled that the claim against a Japanese company by a Korean-American who was a former
POW could go forward.  A week afterwards, a federal appeals court in San Francisco made
the opposite determination in a case involving the consolidated claims of several thousand
former POWs forced to work in camps run by major Japanese conglomerates.  The latter
decision upheld the long-standing contention  of the State Department that only the Federal
Government had the right to “to make and resolve war,” including the resolution of war
claims.  The core issue is whether the Peace Treaty with Japan relieved only the Japanese
government from future claims or whether it covered private companies as well.  On April
30, 2003, the California Supreme Court agreed to review the two cases and the pertinent state
law, which allows victims of World War II forced labor to sue Japanese multinational
companies that operate in California.
A number of bills and amendments introduced in the 107th Congress sought to block the
executive branch from upholding the supremacy of the Peace Treaty in civil suits. On July
18 and September 10, 2001, the House and Senate respectively adopted similar amendments
to H.R. 2500, the Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary appropriations bill for FY2001,
that would prohibit use of funds for filing a motion in any court opposing a civil action
against any Japanese individual or corporation for compensation or reparations in which the
plaintiff alleges that as an American prisoner of war during WWII, he or she was used as a
slave or forced labor.  In a move that generated controversy, the provisions were dropped by
conferees.  The conference report to H.R. 2500 was agreed to in the House on November 14,
2001, and the Senate on November 15; and signed into law by the President on  November
28 (P.L. 107-77).  The conference report explains that the provision was dropped because the
adamant opposition of the President would have jeopardized the bill, but some Senators
expressed reservations, charging that the provision had been the victim of a questionable
“parliamentary tactic.”  (For further background, see CRS Report RL30606, U.S. Prisoners
of War and Civilian American Citizens Captured and Interned by Japan in World War II:
The Issue of Compensation by Japan, by Gary K. Reynolds.)
Kyoto Protocol.  Japan is the fourth leading producer of so-called greenhouse gases
after the United States, the Russian Federation, and China.  Under the Kyoto Protocol,  which
Tokyo ratified on June 4, 2002, Japan is obligated to reduce its emissions 6% below its 1990
levels by 2010.  Japanese industry shares many of the concerns of U.S. industry about the
cost and feasibility of achieving these reductions by the target date of 2012, but the Japanese
government, which places a high value on its support of the protocol, expressed extreme
dismay over the announcement by President George W. Bush that the United States would
back away from the protocol. 
The Whaling Issue.  Members of Congress and Executive branch officials have
criticized Japan’s decision to continue and expand whaling activities, which it claims are
essential for scientific research and support of traditional lifestyles in several coastal
communities.  In 1986, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) implemented a
moratorium on the commercial killing of large whales.  Under the provisions of the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Japan subsequently issued permits
allowing its whalers to kill several hundred minke whales annually in the Antarctic and
northwest Pacific for scientific research.  Since the IWC dictates that research be done in a
non-wasteful manner, the meat from these whales is sold for human consumption in Japan.
Although the IWC has passed several resolutions asking Japan to curtail its research whaling,
in 2000 Japan announced that it was expanding its northwest Pacific hunt to also target
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sperm and Bryde’s whales, due to concerns that increasing whale populations might threaten
fish harvests.  Because the sperm whale is on the U.S. list of endangered species, the Clinton
Administration announced restrictions on Japanese fishing in U.S. waters in September 2000.
In lieu of additional sanctions, which could have been imposed under U.S. law, the United
States and Japan convened a panel of experts to resolve the dispute over Japan’s scientific
research whaling program.  This panel met initially in early November 2000, proposing that
the Scientific Committee of the IWC hold a workshop on scientific research on whale
feeding habits.  On July 26, 2001, the IWC adopted a U.S.-Japan joint proposal for a full-
fledged study of what types of fish and in what quantities are eaten by different species of
whales.  Japan generated additional international criticism in late February 2002 when it
notified the IWC that it planned to double its annual take of minke whales in the North
Pacific from 50 to 100, and to also take 50 sei whales, which are listed by the United States
as an endangered species.  (Prepared by Eugene H. Buck, CRS Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.)
In May 2002 Japan and the United States clashed at a meeting of the International
Whaling Commission in Japan’s former whaling port of Shimonoseki.  Following a
peremptory rejection of a request by Japan to allow the taking of 25 minke whales by what
the Japanese described as “aboriginal peoples” in four communities in northern Japan, the
Japanese delegation blocked a consensus vote on a U.S.-Russian motion to allow Alaskan
Inuit peoples and Indian tribes to continue to kill 61 bowhead and gray whales annually.  A
revised U.S. plan to allow the taking of 11 bowhead whales for five years by the Inuit failed
narrowly to gain the needed three-quarters majority.  Japanese officials charged the United
States, which has consistently opposed Japanese requests to expand coastal whaling, with
reflecting a “double standard,” while the leader of the U.S. delegation decried Japan’s action
as “the most unjust, unkind and unfair vote that was ever taken” by the IWC.  In late June
2002, however, Japan reversed its position and offered to support a quota for Alaskan
whaling if the United States could schedule an IWC meeting before the end of the year, while
also warning that conflict could erupt again if the United States opposed Japanese whaling
at the scheduled 2003 meeting.  In November 2002, the U.N. Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) rejected Japanese proposals to legalize trade in the
meat of minke and Bryde’s whales.
Security Issues
 (This section was written by Larry Niksch)
Japan and the United States are military allies under a Security Treaty concluded in
1960.  Under the treaty, the United States pledges to assist Japan if it is attacked.  Japan
grants the U.S. military base rights on its territory in return for U.S. support to its security.
In recent years Japan has edged closer to a more independent self-defense posture.  A year-
long study by a foreign policy advisory body reported its findings to Prime Minister Koizumi
on November 28, 2002.  The report is said to stress the need for a more comprehensive effort
to deal with an emerging military and regional influence threat from China, for crafting a
policy towards the United States which is compatible with and complements U.S. policy but
also emphasizes Japan’s own foreign and security perspectives and requirements —
including Japan’s policy towards North Korea. 
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Issue of U.S. Bases on Okinawa.  Another issue is that of the impact of the heavy
U.S. military presence on the island of Okinawa.  Large-scale protests erupted in Okinawa
in September 1995, following the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen.
The 29,000 U.S. military personnel on Okinawa comprise more than half the total of 47,000
U.S. troops in Japan. In a September 1996 referendum, the Okinawan people approved a
resolution calling for a reduction of U.S. troop strength on the island.  The U.S. and Japanese
governments concluded an agreement worked out by a Special Action Committee on
Okinawa (SACO) on December 2, 1996, under which the U.S. military will relinquish some
bases and land on Okinawa (21% of the total bases land) over 7 years, but U.S. troop strength
will remain the same.  Alternative sites are to be found for training and the stationing of U.S.
forces.  Japan is to pay the costs of these changes.
 The SACO agreement provides for the relocation of the U.S. Marine air station (MAS)
at Futenma, adjacent to a densely populated area, to another site on Okinawa.  Attempts to
select a site failed until late 1999, partly because of local opposition.   A new site, Nago, in
northern Okinawa was announced by the Japanese government in November 1999.  A
complication has emerged, however, in the form of a demand by the mayor of Nago and
other groups in Okinawa to put a 15-year time limit on U.S. use of the base. 
The bases controversy worsened in 2001 due to allegations of sexual assaults and arson
by several U.S. military personnel.  The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly in February 2001
passed a resolution calling for a reduction of U.S. forces on the island.  Senior Japanese
officials indicated that Japan would seek changes in the implementation of the U.S.-Japan
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which specifies procedures for transfer of custody to
Japan of U.S. military personnel and dependants accused of crimes.  Okinawa’s governor,
elected in 1998 as a moderate on the bases issue, now endorses calls for a 15-year time limit
on the replacement base for Futenma and a reduction in the number of Marines on Okinawa.
The Bush Administration and Pentagon officials have said they are opposed either to
changing the SOFA or to agreeing to a time limit on the basing of U.S. forces on Okinawa.
On July 29, 2002, the Japanese government met with representatives of the Okinawa
prefectural government and concerned municipalities and reached consensus on details of
a planned dual civil-military facility to replace the Futenma Marine Air Station.  The
Japanese government has determined that the facility would be constructed offshore by
reclaiming land on coral reefs near Camp Schwab, an existing Marine base, and would be
2,500 meters in length. Left unresolved was the demand by the Okinawa prefectural
government and local communities that the use of the base by U.S. forces be restricted to a
period of 15 years, a limitation that, as noted above, the U.S. government deems
unacceptable.
Burden Sharing Issues.  The United States has pressed Japan to increase its share
of the costs of American troops and bases.  Under a host nation support (HNS) agreement,
Japan has provided about $2.5 billion annually in direct financial support of U.S. forces in
Japan,  about 77% of the total estimated cost of stationing U.S. troops.  During negotiations
for a new HNS agreement covering the period after March 2001, the Japanese government
proposed a reduction in its contribution of about $70 million.  The Clinton Administration
objected to any reduction, arguing that a substantial Japanese HNS contribution is important
to the strength of the alliance.  A new agreement, signed in September 2000, provides for a
reduction of HNS by slightly over 1% annually through 2006.
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Revised Defense Cooperation Guidelines.  President Clinton and then-Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto issued a Joint U.S.-Japan Declaration on Security on April 17,
1996, affirming that the security alliance would remain relevant for the 21st Century.   U.S.
and Japanese defense officials agreed on a new set of defense cooperation guidelines on
September 24, 1997, replacing guidelines in force since 1978.  The guidelines grant the U.S.
military greater use of Japanese installations in time of crisis. They also refer to a possible,
limited Japanese military role in “situations in areas surrounding Japan” including
minesweeping, search and rescue, and surveillance.  The Japanese Diet passed initial
implementing legislation in late May 1998.
The crises often mentioned are Korea and the Taiwan Strait.  Japan has barred its Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) from operating outside of Japanese territory in accordance with
Article 9 of the 1947 constitution, the so-called no war clause.  Japanese public opinion has
strongly supported the limitations placed on the SDF.  However, Japan has allowed the SDF
since 1991 to participate in a number of United Nations peacekeeping missions.  Japan’s
current Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, has advocated that Japan be able to participate
in collective self-defense, but he said he would not seek a revision of Article 9.  The Bush
Administration says it will seek agreements with Japan which would upgrade Japan’s role
in implementing the 1997 defense guidelines, including crises in “areas surrounding Japan.”
The crises often mentioned are Korea and the Taiwan Strait.  Japan has barred its Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) from operating outside of Japanese territory in accordance with
Article 9 of the 1947 constitution, the so-called no war clause.  Japanese public opinion has
strongly supported the limitations placed on the SDF.  However, Japan has allowed the SDF
since 1991 to participate in a number of United Nations peacekeeping missions.  Japan’s
current Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, has advocated that Japan be able to participate
in collective self-defense, but he said he would not seek a revision of Article 9.  The Bush
Administration says it will seek agreements with Japan which would upgrade Japan’s role
in implementing the 1997 defense guidelines, including crises in “areas surrounding Japan.”
Escalation of the nuclear crisis with North Korea influenced the passage by the Japanese Diet
in May 2003 of three wartime preparedness bills, which specify the powers of the
government to mobilize military forces and adopt other emergency measures.  The North
Korean situation also sparked a debate in Japan over acquiring offensive weaponry that could
be used to attack North Korea. 
Cooperation on Missile Defense.  The Clinton Administration and the Japanese
government agreed in August 1999 to begin cooperative research and development over the
next 5-6 years on four components of the U.S. Navy Theater Wide (NTW) theater missile
program.  Proponents of missile defense justify it based on North Korea’s missile program,
but China has strongly opposed the program.  
Japanese officials, starting with Prime Minister Koizumi, have expressed serious
reservations about the May 1, 2001 announcement by the Bush Administration that the
United States would  proceed with the development and deployment of a national missile
defense (NMD) system regardless of the consequences for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) treaty with the former Soviet Union.  Japan also expressed concern at the decision
of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to eliminate the distinction between NMD and
Theater Missile Defense (TMD), but the Japanese Defense Agency nonetheless has
continued to participate in the joint research program.   The Bush Administration reportedly
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wants Japan to expand the scope of its research to include developing radar and weapons
control systems designed for the U.S. Navy’s Aegis air defense system, which is seen by U.S.
supporters as the most appropriate building-block for developing a near-term NMD system.
Notwithstanding these concerns, Japanese defense policymakers seem highly interested in
acquiring a national missile defense capability.  The Defense Agency reportedly will request
funds in the fiscal 2004 budget for to purchase a U.S. missile defense system, possibly the
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system.  The defense agency also has budgeted for
two new destroyers equipped with the Aegis radar and fire control system (the Japanese navy
has four at present), including upgrades compatible with the later acquisition of a ballistic
missile defense system.  (See CRS Report RL31337.  Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic
Missile Defense:  Issues and Prospects, by Richard P. Cronin.)
Economic Issues
 (This section was written by William Cooper)
Despite Japan’s long economic slump, trade and other economic ties with Japan remain
highly important to U.S. national interests and, therefore, to the U.S. Congress.  The United
States and Japan are the world’s two largest economies, accounting for around 40% of world
gross domestic product (GDP), and their mutual relationship not only has an impact on each
other but on the world as a whole.  Furthermore, their economies are bound by merchandise
trade, trade in services, and foreign investments.
Japan is the United States’s third largest merchandise export market (behind Canada and
Mexico) and the second largest source for U.S. merchandise imports.  Japan also is the
United States’s largest market for exports of services and the second largest source of
services imports.  The United States is Japan’s most important trading partner for exports and
imports of merchandise and services.  Japan is the second largest source of foreign direct
investment in the United States and the fifth largest target for U.S. foreign direct investment
abroad; the United States is Japan’s largest source of foreign direct investment and its largest
target of foreign direct investment abroad.  
Because of the significance of the U.S. and Japanese economies to one another,
domestic economic conditions strongly affect their bilateral relationship.  As a result, Japan’s
continuing economic problems and the recent deceleration of U.S. economic growth have
become central bilateral issues.  Except for some brief periods, Japan has incurred stagnant
or negative economic growth since 1991.  In 2000, real GDP increased 1.5%, declined 0.5%
in 2001, and increased only 0.3% in 2002.  Independent analysts remain skeptical of the
long-term prospects for the Japanese economy given other indicators showing weakness
including declining business investment and an unemployment rate of 5.2% as of February
2003 (the latest data available).   (For more information on Japan’s economic problems, see
CRS Report RL30176, Japan’s “Economic Miracle”:  What Happened?) 
Economists and policymakers in Japan and in the United States have attributed Japan’s
difficulties to a number of factors, including the collapse of the investment “bubble” in the
early 1990s and ineffective fiscal and monetary policies and structural economic problems,
including the continuing problem of non-performing loans held by Japanese banks.   
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If Japanese economic problems are occupying the center of U.S.-Japanese economic
ties, some long-standing trade disputes continue to irritate the relationship.  The U.S.
bilateral trade deficit with Japan reached $81.3 billion in 2000, breaking the previous record
of $73.9 billion set in 1999.  (See Table 1.)   However, in 2001, the U.S. trade deficit
declined 15%, primarily because of the slowdown in the U.S. economy, but increased
moderately to $70.1 billion in 2002.
Table 1.  U.S. Trade with Japan, 1996-2003
($ billions)
Year Exports Imports Balances
1996 67.5 115.2 - 47.7
1997 65.7 121.4 - 55.7
1998 57.9 122.0 - 64.1
1999 57.5 131.4 - 73.9
2000 65.3 146.6 - 81.3
2001 57.6 126.6 -69.0
2002 51.4 121.5 -70.1
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  FT900.  Exports are total exports valued on
a f.a.s .basis.  Imports are general imports valued on a customs basis.
In addition, Japan has raised concerns over U.S. actions to restrict steel imports from
Japan and other countries.  U.S. steel workers and producers have cited a surge in steel
imports after 1997 as a reason for financial problems they face.  They have claimed that
foreign dumping, government subsidies, and general overcapacity in the world steel industry
have strained their ability to compete. 
On March 5, 2002, President Bush announced that the government would impose higher
tariffs on imports of selected steel products after the U.S. International Trade Commission
determined under section 201 (safeguards or escape clause trade remedy)  that surges in steel
imports caused or threatened to cause serious injury to the U.S. domestic steel industry.  On
March 6, the Japanese government called the decision regrettable.  On March 20, Prime
Minister Koizumi’s government requested formal consultations with the United States
through the World Trade Organization (WTO), stating that the U.S. action was not in
compliance with WTO rules and that the problems of the U.S. steel industry were due to its
lack of international competitiveness and not imports. The Japanese government threatened
to impose retaliatory tariffs on U.S. steel exports worth $5 million by June 18.  However, on
June 13, the government announced it would delay action.  On August 23 the Japanese
Foreign Trade Ministry announced that it would not retaliate against U.S. section 201
measures against on steel imports, defusing what was potentially a very contentious issue in
U.S.-Japan trade relations.  Japanese Foreign Trade Minister Takeo Hiranuma  pointed to
exclusions of some 40% of Japanese steel exports to the United States from the original
section 201 measure as the primary reason for pulling back on retaliation.  
Nevertheless, Japan and several other steel exporting countries pursued a case  in the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body against the U.S. action.   Along with Japan, the EU, Brazil,
China, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, and Switzerland argued that the United States
did not follow WTO rules in imposing the safeguard actions, a conclusion the United States
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strongly denies.  On March 26, 2003, the WTO Dispute Panel issued its preliminary decision,
ruling against the United States and maintained that determination in its May 2 final decision.
The Bush Administration is expected to appeal the decision. 
The steel case and other disputes mark a trend in U.S.-Japan trade relations in which the
two countries have chosen to address their differences in the WTO rather than bilaterally.
Japan, together with other major trading partners, has challenged U.S. trade laws and actions
in the WTO.  For example, Japan and others challenged the U.S. 1916 Antidumping law and
the so-called “Byrd Law” (that allows revenues from countervailing duty and antidumping
orders to be distributed to those who had been injured).  In both cases, the WTO ruled in
their favor.
Japan and the United States are strong supporters of the Doha Development Agenda,
the latest round of negotiations in the WTO.  Yet, the two have taken divergent positions in
some critical areas of the agenda.  For example, the United States, Australia, and other major
agricultural exporting countries have pressed for the reduction or removal of barriers to
agricultural imports and subsidies of agricultural production, a position strongly opposed by
Japan and the EU.  At the same time, Japan and others have argued that national antidumping
laws and actions that member countries have taken should be examined during the DDA,
with the possibility of changing them, a position that the United States has opposed.
Japanese Political Developments
 (This section was written by Mark Manyin)
Current Situation.  Since his unconventional rise to power in April 2001, Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi has been one of the most popular Japanese rulers in years,
notwithstanding the public’s gradual disillusionment with Koizumi that has reduced his
approval ratings 40-50% range, down from over 80% in mid-2001.  The key to Koizumi’s
relative popularity is his appeal to independent voters, who constitute a majority of the
Japanese electorate and tend to back reformist politicians.  As Prime Minister, Koizumi has
attempted to seize the machinery of government away from the factions that have long
dominated the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan’s dominant political party.   Lacking
a strong base within the LDP, Koizumi’s popularity is one of the few weapons he wields
against the “old guard” that are strongholds of the “old economy” interests most threatened
by Koizumi’s agenda.  To date, these groups generally have been successful in watering
down most of his economic reforms.  Another factor that has helped keep Koizumi in power
is the absence of any politicians in the LDP or in Japan’s opposition parties who have the
political strength to replace Koizumi in the near future. 
Koiuzmi’s term as LDP President expires in September 2003.  Several LDP old guard
members have indicated they would prefer to jettison Koizumi.  There is speculation that
many favor the conservative Tokyo mayor Shintaro Ishihara, Japan’s second-most popular
politician.  Japanese law, however, stipulates that the prime minister must be a sitting
member of Parliament, which would appear to rule out Ishihara.  If Koizumi succeeds in
retaining his position as LDP leader, some believe he may try to consolidate his base in the
fall of 2003 by dissolving parliament and calling nationwide parliamentary elections. 
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In general, Japan’s political peculiarities constrain U.S. influence over Japanese policy.
Most importantly, the relative weakness of the Japanese prime minister and cabinet often
make it difficult to for Japanese leaders to reach and then deliver on controversial agreements
with foreign countries.  Presently, U.S. options are further limited by the widely-held
perception that Koizumi represents the best hope for pushing through economic and security
reforms the U.S. has sought.  This belief has led the Bush Administration generally to avoid
criticizing Koizumi publicly, for fear of diminishing his political effectiveness.  
Background — The Political System’s Inertia. Despite over a  decade of
economic stagnation,  or negative growth, Japan’s political system — indeed, many of
Japan’s economic policies — have remained fundamentally unchanged.  What accounts for
this striking inertia?  Three features of Japan’s political system give vested interests an
inordinate amount of power in Japan:  the extreme compartmentalization of policy-making;
the factional divisions of the Liberal Democratic Party; and the weakness of the opposition
parties.  Many of Koizumi’s most far-reaching reform proposals actually are attempts to alter
the first and second of these characteristics.  
The Compartmentalization of Policy-Making.  To a striking degree, Japan’s
policymaking process tends to be heavily compartmentalized.  Policy debates typically are
confined to sector-specific, self-contained policy arenas that are defined by the jurisdictional
boundaries of a specific ministry.  Each policy community stretches vertically between
bureaucrats, LDP policy experts, interest groups, and academic experts.  Unlike in most
industrialized societies, each policy arena in Japan is so self-contained that cross-sectoral,
horizontal coalitions among interest groups rarely form.  One reason for this is that
bureaucrats are paramount in most of Japan’s policy compartments.  Only in matters
involving highly politicized industries such as agriculture and security policy have politicians
and interest groups become significant players in the policymaking process.  Even in these
areas, responsibility for carving out the details of policy still rests with the bureaucrats, in
part because Japanese politicians often only have a handful of staffers to assist them. 
Furthermore, the LDP’s policymaking organ, the Policy Affairs Research Council
(PARC), itself is segmented into specialist caucuses (often called “tribes” or zoku), so that
competing interests — such as protectionist farmers and export industries — rarely face off
inside the LDP.  For this reason, the LDP often finds it difficult to make trade-offs among
its various constituencies.  The result is often paralysis or incremental changes at the margins
of policy. Koizumi has attempted — thus far with limited success — to change this by
centralizing more power in the Prime Minister’s office, at the expense of the PARC and the
bureaucracies.  
The Factional Nature of the Liberal Democratic Party.  The LDP has been the
dominant political force in Japan since its formation in 1955.  It is not a political party in the
traditional sense because it has long been riven by clique-like factions that jealously compete
for influence with one another.  For instance, cabinet posts, including the office of prime
minister, typically have been filled not on the  basis of merit or policy principles but rather
with a view towards achieving a proper balance among faction leaders, who act behind-the-
scenes as kingpins.  Because the LDP president (who de facto becomes Japan’s prime
minister) is not the true leader of the party, he often lacks the power to resolve divisive intra-
party disputes or even to set the party’s agenda.  
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For over two decades, the LDP’s dominant faction has been the one founded by former
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in the 1970s.  It is currently headed by former Prime Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto, who in April 2001 was surprisingly defeated by Koizumi in the selection
for LDP President due to an unprecedented revolt by reformist party members.  Coinciding
with his selection as LDP President, Koizumi bucked party tradition first by resigning from
his own faction and then by giving the anti-reformist Hashimoto group only one Cabinet
post. 
One result of the LDP’s opaque, top-down decision-making structure is that it has been
slow to adapt to changes in Japanese society.  The LDP has coddled many of Japan’s
declining sectors, such as the agriculture and construction industries, which have provided
the money and manpower for the party’s political activities.  Corruption has thrived in this
machine-politics system; over the past thirty years many of the LDP’s top leaders have been
implicated in various kickback scandals.  Compounding the problem is that Japan’s electoral
districting system overweights rural voters compared with more reformist-minded urbanites;
each rural vote is worth an estimated two urban votes. 
Over the past decade, a bloc of independent voters — who now constitute a majority
of the voting population — has arisen opposing the LDP’s “business as usual” political
system.  Urban, younger, and increasingly female, this pool of independents has shown itself
willing to support politicians, such as Koizumi, who appear sincerely committed to reform
(although when pressed, many of these same voters oppose specific structural — and
potentially painful  — economic reforms).  Thus, the LDP is under severe, perhaps
unmanageable, stress: to succeed in future elections, it must become more appealing to the
new generation of reform-minded voters.  Yet, if it adopts political and economic reforms,
it risks antagonizing its traditional power base.  
The rise of unaffiliated voters helps explain the LDP’s steadily declining strength in the
Diet (the Japanese parliament) over the past decade.  Since it was briefly ousted from power
in 1993 and 1994, the LDP’s lack of a majority in both houses of the Diet has forced it to
retain power only by forming coalitions with smaller parties.  Today, that coalition includes
the Buddhist-affiliated New Komeito Party and the right-of-center New Conservative Party.
In October 2001, victories in bi-elections gave the LDP its first majority in the 480-seat
Lower House in years.  However, the party still lacks a majority in the less powerful Upper
House.  It therefore continues to depend on its two coalition partners to be assured that
legislation will pass, making radical policies that much more difficult to adopt.  
The Weakness of the Opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).
Koizumi’s recent resurgence has further weakened the DPJ, Japan’s largest opposition party.
The DPJ, which describes itself as “centrist,” is led by Naoto Kan.  The DPJ was formed in
April 1998 as a merger among four smaller parties. This amalgamation has led to
considerable internal contradictions, primarily between the party’s hawkish/conservative and
passivist/liberal wings.  As a result, on most issues the DPJ has not formulated coherent
alternative policies to the LDP, which perhaps explains why the DPJ’s approval ratings have
rarely surpassed 20%, and have fallen into the single-digit levels in recent months. Some
commentators have speculated that Koizumi may attempt to realign the Japanese political
scene by bolting from the LDP and allying with the DPJ’s more conservative wing, led by





To provide compensation for certain World War II veterans who survived the Bataan
Death March and were held as prisoners of war by the Japanese.  Introduced February 5,
2003; referred to House Committee on Arms Services. Executive branch comment requested
from the Department of Defense, February 28, 2003.
H.R. 1864 (Rohrabacher)
To preserve certain actions in Federal court brought by former prisoners of war seeking
compensation from Japanese entities for mistreatment or failure to pay wages in connection
with slave or forced labor.  Introduced April 9, 2003; referred to House Committees on the
Judiciary, International Relations, and Government Reform.  Referred to Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, May 5, 2003.
